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In the chapter “The Historical Imagination” of  his now classic The Idea 
of  History,1 R. G. Collingwood identifies historical thought as the domi-
nant interest of  modernity. History, he argues, has evolved since early mo-
dernity a technique no less structured and certain than that of  her “elder 
sister,” physical science, which dominated thought in the seventeenth cen-
tury (Collingwood 232). But Collingwood rejects what he calls the “com-
mon-sense theory” of  history, according to which the historian relies on 
documentary sources to record facts objectively as they have happened. 
By recognising that, for the historian, imagination in the (re)construction 
of  historical events is “not ornamental but structural” and “a priori” (241), 
and that the historian himself  – rather than (presumed) objective facts – is 
his own ultimate authority, “it is possible to effect what one might call a 
Copernican revolution in the theory of  history” (236).
For us, steeled in the (post)structuralist and postmodern debates of  the 
second half  of  the last century, the withdrawal of  authoritative status from 
historical fact may not seem so bold a move. Even when Collingwood was 
writing, the objective status of  external reality was being queried in various 
fields; we might think of  the concern with the subjectivity of  perception 
and the power of  language to shape reality differently, or of  the challenge 
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to the ideological premises of  supposedly objective, factual genres that we 
find in writings as diverse as the fiction of  Joyce and Woolf, the linguistics 
of  Saussure and Sapir-Whorf, or the “new biography” of  Strachey and other 
members of  the Bloomsbury group. But in the 1930s the positivist model of  
historiography still dominated, and relocating authority from the objectivity 
of  external facts to their narrative reconstruction by the historian was still a 
radical step, and one that can be seen as a pivotal moment in the twentieth-
century’s evolving reflection on the nature of  “referential” discourses.
Thus Collingwood’s description of  this shift of  perspective as the 
possibility of  “a Copernican revolution in the theory of  history” almost 
inevitably prompts reference to Thomas Kuhn’s equally groundbreaking 
model of  the history of  science. In the terms of  Kuhn’s The Structure of  
Scientific Revolutions, what Collingwood effects through this radical reversal 
of  our understanding of  historiography and of  the nature of  historical 
truth would be defined as a “paradigm shift.”
The way “normal science” (scientific research firmly based on the foun-
dations of  past scientific achievements and of  accepted theories) operates 
within the stable scientific paradigm (briefly: the sets of  theories and beliefs 
that at any given time govern the way scientific knowledge is organised and 
new information is sought), may be compared to the “common-sense theory 
of  history,” insofar as both these normalising modes of  operating assume 
that the methods and principles governing research within their disciplines 
conform to the structure of  reality and therefore best allow us to describe 
it. When “normal” scientific activity produces data that cannot be accom-
modated within the existing scientific theories, the paradigm starts to come 
under pressure and moments of  crisis occur, leading to a sense of  confu-
sion, of  loss of  reference points and of  certainties (the ramifications may 
be felt well beyond the group of  specialists, as we see in the wider social ef-
fects of  heliocentrism, or of  Darwinian evolutionary theory). A battle then 
ensues within the scientific community over the conflicting theories, until a 
new paradigm is accepted, and this is what Kuhn calls a “paradigm shift.” 
Collingwood’s interrogation of  the principles of  historical writing similarly 
comes at a time when the predominant model is unable to answer satisfacto-
rily the questions asked of  it; his unhinging of  narrative from proven objec-
tive truth can thus be seen to herald a new “paradigm” (I place it in quota-
tion marks so as not to elide the differences that remain between Kuhn’s and 
Collingwood’s systems) that privileges the historian’s choice and focuses on 
the structures of  linguistic and narrative accounts – what would later come 
to the foreground in postmodernist and New Historicist historiography.
In the 1960s and 1970s, in the context of  the debate on “the Two 
Cultures” prompted by the Snow-Leavis controversy, but especially of  the 

Lucia Boldrini:     Keeping our Nerve: Scientific and Historical Paradigms in John Banville’s Doctor Copernicus
impact of  Foucault’s writing on Western knowledge and of  “the linguistic 
turn” of  theory, Kuhn’s work was seized on to blur the differences be-
tween discursive disciplines and those traditionally based on external evi-
dence. But while Kuhn himself  had pointed out a fundamental similarity 
of  the two he was also careful to warn against a too hasty juxtaposition of  
the scientific and artistic models. In the 1969 “Postscript” to The Structure 
of  Scientific Revolutions Kuhn suggests that he had taken the pattern of  “sci-
entific development as a succession of  tradition-bound periods punctu-
ated by non-cumulative breaks” from historians of  “literature, of  music, 
of  the arts, of  political development,” for whom “[p]eriodization in terms 
of  revolutionary breaks in style, taste, and institutional structure have been 
among […] standard tools” (208), and in a later essay he points out that 
“the artist too, like the scientist, faces persistent technical problems which 
must be resolved in the pursuit of  his craft” while “the scientist, like the 
artist, is guided by aesthetic considerations and governed by established 
modes of  perception” (“Comment” 343). But he also insists that “[c]lose 
analysis must again be enabled to display the obvious: that science and art 
are very different enterprises or at least have become so during the last 
century and a half ” (“Comment” 341), notably in respect of  their relation-
ship with aesthetics, with their public, and with their past achievements (I 
shall return to this last point later).2 Collingwood was likewise careful to 
distinguish the sphere of  historical research from that of  fictional narra-
tive despite their profound analogy: while the latter need only be bound by 
laws of  internal artistic coherence, the historian will select, combine, and 
use his imagination in the narrative of  events but must neither invent facts 
to prop his argument, nor suppress those that might undermine it.
If  I return to these issues and bring together Collingwood and Kuhn, it 
is precisely because of  the impact in the 1960s and 1970s of  their call for a 
rethink the premises of  their respective disciplines, and because it is such 
moments of  historical, scientific, and cultural crisis and renovation, with 
their attendant sense of  apprehension, confusion, and loss of  stable valu-
es that are explored in John Banville’s Doctor Copernicus.3 This postmodern 
novel, published in 1976, combines detailed historical reconstruction, cul-
tural analysis, and the examination of  (our construction of) the mecha-
nisms of  historical and scientific evolution in order to reflect, finally, on 
the present condition. By engaging the discourses of  science, biography, 
fiction, historiography and economics it shows their interrelatedness in 
the “historical paradigm,” and by placing the figure of  Copernicus at the 
centre both of  the scientific revolution (or “paradigm shift”) and the bro-
ader historical and cultural upheavals of  early modernity and of  the sense 
of  crisis of  knowledge and values of  the latter part of  the 20th century, it 
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furthermore implicitly extends Kuhn’s analysis of  the history of  science 
to a more encompassing, Foucauldian notion of  epochal episteme. Much of  
this sense of  displacement appears to depend on the mismatch between 
our perceptions of  reality and the structures through which we know how 
to explain and understand reality itself, and it thus centres, at both ends of  
the historical spectrum, on the fracture between the desire to know reality 
as it is and our ability to represent it adequately. It is to this confluence of  
discourses in Doctor Copernicus that I therefore now turn.
The protagonist of  Doctor Copernicus is a perfectly identifiable histori-
cal character, and the faithfulness to historical and biographical “fact” is 
very precise throughout the novel – indeed, almost be too precise to be 
believed:
people still come to me and say about Copernicus, “was that really his life? Did he 
do all those things?” I say to them “yes” and they look at me and don’t believe it. 
So that when you actually do supply them with facts they don’t believe it. If  you 
reason it out, they’re quite right. Because a novelist has no business taking actual 
historically recorded facts. (Sheehan 83)
The genre signposted from the start is that of  the Joycean Bildungsroman, 
marked by the third person narration and the adoption of  the character’s 
perceptual, emotional, and intellectual point of  view that gradually evolves 
from the child’s to the young man’s to the adult’s. Unlike in A Portrait of  
the Artist as a Young Man, however, the voice is from the beginning that 
of  a narrator that translates the perceptions of  the child into a language 
rich with literary and philosophical echoes. The novel mimics then the 
style and conventions of  biographical narration, moving on after that to 
a traditional omniscient and somewhat patronising narrator. There are 
then pages in epistolary form, and the second part is framed by allegori-
cal, almost visionary, Gothic passages that re-echo throughout the novel. 
A completely different portrait of  Copernicus appears in the third part 
through the (auto)biography of  his disciple Rheticus, an utterly unreliable 
narrator who invents or distorts facts animated by resentment and spirit 
of  revenge towards the astronomer. Copernicus also voices thoughts that 
the final notes ascribe to more recent figures such as Einstein, Planck, 
Kierkegaard, and in the fourth part any semblance of  psychological real-
ism is further disrupted by the imaginary, allegorical debate, also full of  
anachronistic references, between the old scientist, victim of  a stroke, and 
his dead brother Andreas.
It is almost as if  different points of  view and voices, different narrative 
models, were tried out in the search for the most adequate biographical 
model that can present the character reliably and convincingly, and this 
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goes hand in hand with the character’s own construction, or search for, 
a scientific model through which to express and reveal the truth of  the 
cosmos and of  the natural world.
In The Copernican Revolution (1957), cited by Banville as one of  his 
sources, Thomas Kuhn presents Copernicus as a man suspended between 
the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, his De Revolutionibus – “a revolu-
tion-making, rather than a revolutionary text” – as “at once ancient and 
modern, conservative and radical” (134-35). In the novel, the use of  the 
proper name becomes a pivot of  this “suspension” between two worlds, 
two epochs, different artistic and scientific necessities, and focuses the 
ways in which the individual belongs to history and to different, shifting 
“historical paradigms.” The proper name should be the fixed, untranslat-
able mark of  individual and family identity, and yet debating the derivation 
of  the name Koppernigk from an uncertain, material origin seems to be 
the first and foremost necessity in biographies of  the scientist – almost 
as if  this were a way of  tying him back to the earth he’d sent out spin-
ning into the universe. Open to different interpretations, the name can be 
linked to different “things” depending on the eulogistic or spiteful inten-
tion of  the speaker:
Burnished sheets of  copper glowed […] and happiness seemed a copper-colou-
red word. It was from this metal that the family had its name, his father said, and 
not from the Polish coper, meaning horseradish, as some were spiteful enough to 
suggest. Horseradish indeed!  (8)
To complicate matters, Copernicus himself  varied the spelling of  his 
name depending on the context and the nature of  the documents: Copernic 
in official administration, Coppernic when the area was German speaking, 
Copernicus in official correspondence and in literary and scientific manu-
scripts. The signature could further vary into Koppernieck, Kopperlingk, 
Kupernik, etc. The form historically “approved” and used in most biogra-
phies, including the one by Arthur Koestler, which Banville has consulted 
extensively (244), and that written in the nineteenth century by Leopold 
Prowe and still considered the authoritative text, is Koppernigk (Koestler 
n. 1 569). What matters, however, is not what the various forms were 
but what Banville makes of  this etymological and graphic uncertainty. It 
is when reference is made to the origins of  the name that the narrative 
technique shifts from that of  the Joycean Bildungsroman to the traditional 
biographical narration, with the account of  the family origins:
The Koppernigks had originated in Upper Silesia, from whence in 1396 one Niklas 
Koppernigk, a stonemason by trade, had moved to Cracow and taken Polish citi-
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zenship. His son, Johannes, was the founder of  the merchant house that in the late 
1450s young Nicolas’s father was to transfer to Torun in Royal Prussia. (8)
The name gives the character his place in history and fixes his social 
identity, also identifying the family as one which had a good nose for busi-
ness: the move to Krakow occurs when the city becomes the royal seat and 
builders and stonemasons are in great demand; the family then transfer to 
Torun when the relatively peaceful and prosperous 15th century turned 
the Vistula into one of  the main commercial routes of  Eastern Europe. 
To free himself  from this net of  pre-fixed identity, Nicolas must perform 
a symbolic act of  defiance and of  rupture that will enable him to assert 
his individuality and make a new, independent name for himself, a name 
that would signify his true, essential, autonomous identity and which can 
become his own personal seal on the new world view coined by his revo-
lutionary scientific theory:
They might try, but they would not take everything from him, no. If  the sentry 
were to accost him now he would announce himself  fiercely, would bellow his 
name and impress it like a seal upon the waxen darkness for all Heilsberg to hear: 
Doctor Copernicus! (109)
This self-made name, sanctioned by history ever since as “Copernicus,” 
supplants in history the – until then – historically sanctioned family name 
“Koppernigk.” It is here then that the rupture is located: in the intentional 
and individual choice, by the subject, of  the subject’s own manner of  
belonging in/to history. It is thanks to this new name that the charac-
ter Doctor Copernicus can engrave, impress (Greek kharássein) his own 
uniqueness upon history, like a seal on wax  (a wax remindful perhaps 
of  the second Cartesian meditation on the proofs of  the existence of  
the subject (Descartes 89-95)), like a sort of  copyright mark upon the 
new structure of  modern thought. This historical-genealogical fracture 
coincides with the scientific and philosophical fracture of  traditional cos-
mology, while the shift from an identity centred in one’s place in the pre-
determined social structure to one centred on individuality – the act of  
self-creation – coincides with the moving of  the centre of  the cosmos 
from the earth to the sun.
Having drawn my neat parallels, I must also point out that Copernicus’ 
rebel cry to assert his name and impress it like a seal upon the waxen dark-
ness of  the night in fact goes totally unnoticed by the sentry guarding the 
gate of  the town: “But the sentry was asleep” (109), and he never even 
utters his rebellious cry. To pursue this ironic counterpoint further and 
modulate my own emphasis on the centrality of  “character” in the novel, 
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another statement by Banville may be noted: “I have no interest in charac-
terisation. Prior to Copernicus, in which I had the characters made for me, I 
consciously chose absolute stereotypes” (Sheehan 83).
Kharaktér describes both the tool that allows a mark, a seal, a stamp 
to be impressed, for example on coins so as to give them their value, and 
the imprint itself  that fixes the value of  the coin. Thus it is appropriate 
that Banville should choose “stereotyped” characters (characters whose 
meaning and value is pre-fixed – like historical ones, on whom the author’s 
imagination and invention can only exercise limited intervention), and 
it acquires even greater significance that Copernicus should choose his 
own value, his own character. Above all, it is significant that the issue of  
character construction, which in a way is the central issue of  biographical 
writing, should be thus connected with the question of  value, of  money, 
of  coins: for in the novel there is a subtext, an undercurrent that plays 
against the scientific and the imaginary – what should be concerned with 
the priceless, the absolute – and concerns instead the question of  money, 
of  the economy of  meanings, of  the value of  science. In 1522, by request 
of  the Prussian Diet, Copernicus wrote a treatise to implement a reform 
of  the monetary system that fixed the quantity of  metals to be used in 
coins, introduced state monopoly on the issuing of  money, regulated the 
amount of  currency that may circulate at any given moment (Koestler 
145; n. 28 571). Thus Copernicus also takes his place within the nascent 
modern economic structure, and this links it with the new cosmology. 
Of  course, this early capitalist development is only envisaged: the domi-
nant system remains the hierarchical, feudal system based on land control 
through ecclesiastical tithes, and indeed it is one of  Copernicus’ tasks, 
during the war between Poland and the Teutonic Knights of  Prussia, to 
ensure that the land is cultivated and farms are not abandoned. The con-
ditions of  the peasants, whose status is that of  serfs “tied” to the land, 
but who nevertheless seek to escape to the safety of  towns when the war 
is fought on their lands and on their bodies, is often referred to in the 
novel. The link between money and cosmology in the (self-)construction 
of  Copernicus’ character prompts us to read the contrast between the two 
opposite views of  the cosmos and of  man (medieval and modern; pre- 
and post-Copernican revolution) also in terms of  the changing economic 
structure that evolves from the tie with the earth and the “fixity” of  the 
“natural” value of  things towards a target of  free movement, variability 
and productivity that becomes autonomous from nature and is control-
led by man through conventional and arbitrary laws increasingly detached 
from the rhythm of  the apparent but regular and natural movement of  
the sun.
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This also extends to the verbal and scientific accounts that, by their very 
nature of  vehicles of  communicative exchange, become substitutes for 
their referent. It is Nicolas’ father, the Torun merchant, who explains to 
him “the meaning of  money” (6), linking it to the value of  words and of  
representations:
Coins, you see, are only for poor people, simple people, and for little boys. They 
are only a kind of  picture of  the real thing, but the real thing itself  you cannot 
see, nor put in your pocket, and it does not jingle. When I do business with other 
merchants I have no need of  these silly bits of  metal, and my purse may be full or 
empty, it makes no difference. I give my word, and that is sufficient, because my 
word is money. Do you see? (6)
Nicolas “did not see” (6), but the parallel has been established between 
monetary and verbal systems of  substitution, and he will later extend it to 
the scientific system of  representation, when as an astronomer he seeks 
to explain the universe through an abstract model that he would like to be 
true (“He had believed it possible to say the truth”), but whose inevitable 
and frustrating conventionality, fictionality, and yet necessity he has to rec-
ognise (“now he saw that all that could be said was the saying. His book 
was not about the world, but about itself,” 116).
The poet knows that in order to see clearly things in their essence one 
would need to “become an ignorant man again” and elude any kind of  
formalisation or interposition of  cultural, historical, social filters. The epi-
graph of  the novel is taken from Wallace Stevens’ Notes Toward a Supreme 
Fiction:
You must become an ignorant man again
And see the sun again with an ignorant eye
And see it clearly in the idea of  it.
The child too, like the poet, can have access to the vision thanks to 
his infantile (non verbal, or pre-verbal) perceptions. At the beginning of  
the novel little Nicolas – as yet unnamed – feels one with the linden tree, 
also as yet unnamed and unidentified: “At first it had no name. It was the 
thing itself, the vivid thing. It was his friend. On windy days it danced, 
demented, waving wild arms” (3). Nicolas’ infantile perception of  the tree 
is intuitive, of  direct access to the object and of  union with it. It is only 
when the tree is given a name that Nicolas (whose name we also learn now 
for the first time) learns to distinguish it, and thus to distinguish himself  
from it, and to recognise the relationship between words and the world 
of  things:
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 Look, Nicolas, look! See the big tree!
  Tree. That was its name. And also: the linden. They were nice words. He had 
known them a long time before he knew what they meant. They did not mean 
themselves, they were nothing in themselves, they meant the dancing singing thing 
outside. (3)
“The artist like the infant, must learn to speak in order to assimilate 
the world” says Banville in a talk given in 1981, 5 years after the publica-
tion of  the novel (“A Talk” 15). The essential truth, “the thing itself ” (a 
phrase frequently repeated in the novel, with an – often ironic – echo of  
the Kantian Ding an sich) can only be intuited with a creative / poetic act of  
the mind, suggesting the alliance of  poetry and philosophy, as in Goethe’s 
Dichtung und Wahrheit or Heidegger’s Dichten und Denken. The paradox of  
course is that language will “mediate,” interpose itself  between self  and 
world, word and thing – and often it won’t even be able to mediate: “The 
universe of  dancing planets was out there, and he was here, and between 
the two spheres mere words and figures on paper could not mediate” 
(Doctor Copernicus 93). It is the problem that besets the scientist through his 
life: on the one hand the desire to capture the truth of  the world, even the 
possibility of  intuiting it in the instant of  vision; on the other, the inevita-
ble reduction of  it to an arbitrary, conventional model, and the apprehen-
sion that a model may be superseded by a new one: the necessity, in order 
to see each time anew, to become each time a blind, ignorant man again.
It is only on his deathbed that Copernicus will find again just for a 
moment the lost unity with “things” and with the linden tree of  his child-
hood, re-uniting again his sundered self, finally hearing in the everyday 
noises of  life that “music of  the spheres” to which his ears had yearned 
all his life. Coins jingle, the thing itself  doesn’t, his father had taught him. 
Coins are only for little boys, the grown up scientist yearns for the real 
thing, yet he wants to hear its music. It is only when he is again like a “little 
boy,” an infant in his senility, hallucinating, “demented” as a consequence 
of  a stroke, that he can hear the music, the jingle of  the real thing, and this 
music is not that of  the cold, silent spheres, but the voices of  the common 
people, of  their everyday lives. The historical circle of  biography, the orbit 
of  a life is closed, the circulation / revolution of  meanings, names, of  the 
values of  words and things is completed – and they do jingle, toll, and call 
him away to them:
and Nicolas, straining to catch that melody, heard the voices of  evening rising 
to meet him from without: the herdsman’s call, the cries of  children at play, the 
rumbling of  the carts returning from market; and there were other voices too, of  
churchbells gravely tolling the hour, of  dogs that barked afar, of  the sea, of  the 
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earth itself, turning in its course, and of  the wind, out of  huge blue air, sighing in 
the leaves of  the linden. All called and called to him, and called, calling him away. 
(242)
The tension between the desire for a scientific “truth” that is more 
than just a “model” and our attempts at description – that can only be 
models – already emerge during Nicolas’ student days, when he thinks 
he can discern the trace of  a doubt in the writings of  his professor of  
astronomy, and this makes tangible for him the crisis of  a system and the 
slow but inevitable advent of  a new one:
Nicolas had read everything the Professor had ever written on the Ptolemaic theo-
ry. Out of  all those weary hours of  wading through the dry sands of  a sealed mind 
there had been distilled one tiny precious drop of  a pearly doubt. He could no 
longer remember where or when he had found the flaw, along what starry trajec-
tory, on which rung of  those steadily ascending ladders of  tabular calculation, but 
once detected it had brought the entire edifice of  a life’s work crashing down with 
slow dreamlike inevitability. Professor Brudzewski knew that Ptolemy was gravely wrong. 
He could not of  course admit it, even to himself; his investment was too great for 
that. This failure of  nerve explained to Nicolas how it was that a mathematician 
of  the first rank could stoop into deceit in order, in Aristotle’s words, to save the phe-
nomena, that is, to devise a theory grounded firmly in the old reactionary dogmas 
that yet would account for the observed motions of  the planets. (29)
Of  course, the Professor denies that such heresy can be gleaned in his 
writing:
You are asking our science to perform tasks which it is incapable of  performing. 
Astronomy does not describe the universe as it is, but only as we observe it. That 
theory is correct, therefore, which accounts for our observations. (35)
Brudzewski is with these words almost signals an awareness that is 
more modern, more “Kuhnian,” than that of  Copernicus, who wants to 
get to the “vivid truth” of  the cosmos. He does so, he thinks, in a clear, 
pure instant of  vision. Theoría etymologically translates as “spectacle,” 
“contemplation” (from theorein, “to see” or “look” in the abstract sense, in 
turn derived from the root theãsthai, from which also comes “theatre” as 
“place where one sees, or looks” (Klein s.v. “theory”)). Copernicus’ theory, 
in short, is his intuitive vision: he is the spectator of  a mental representa-
tion of  the cosmos that he mistakes for its reality. But the linguistic trans-
lation of  the vision, “instead of  approaching the word, the crucial Word,” 
can only fade into “loquacious silence” (116). The theory, so simple in its 
purity, but then also so illusory, is both original creation and radical rup-
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ture with tradition and the dominant culture of  the time. At war here are 
not only two different scientific paradigms, but also two conceptions of  
truth. The change of  paradigm is Kuhnian, the language visionary:
Nothing less than a new and radical instauration would do, if  astronomy was to 
mean more than itself. /…/ The closed system of  the science must be broken 
/…/ the birth of  the new science must be preceded by a radical act of  creation. 
/…/ Calmly then it came, the solution, like a magnificent great slow golden bird 
alighting in his head with a thrumming of  vast wings. It was so simple, so ravis-
hingly simple, that at first he did not recognise it for what it was. /…/ What mat-
tered was not the propositions, but the combining of  them: the act of  creation. He 
turned the solution this way and that, admiring it, as it were turning in his fingers 
a flawless ravishing jewel. It was the thing itself, the vivid thing. (83-85)
Copernicus too has a moment of  doubt, and experiences a sense of  
loss, fear, and confusion similar to that described by Kuhn at the end of  
a paradigm:
No sooner had he realised the absolute necessity for a creative leap than his in-
stincts without his knowing had thrown up their defences against such a scanda-
lous notion, thrusting him back into the closed system of  worn-out orthodoxies. 
(85)
The astronomer sees in his revolutionary discovery, compounded with 
his own doubts about his theory, the risk of  death: the death of  faith, of  
man’s trust in his own strength and in his centrality, in the structures that 
have sustained society for centuries:
He would be dragged out, kicking and howling, into the market place /…/ he be-
gan to wonder if  he would be well advised to destroy his work. /…/ They would 
seize upon his work, or a mangled version of  it more like, with awful fervour, besi-
de themselves in their eagerness to believe that what he was offering them was an 
explanation of  the world and their lives in it. And when sooner or later it dawned 
upon them that they had been betrayed yet again, that here was no simple compre-
hensive picture of  reality, no new instauration, then they would turn on him. /…/ 
They must be made to understand that by banishing Earth and man along with it 
from the centre of  the universe, he was passing no judgements, expounding no 
philosophy, but merely stating what is the case. (119-20)
(Ironically, there is no such outrage, not yet: paradigms shift slowly). 
This is just what had happened to Brudzewski, whose nerve failed him, 
who accepted to sink back into that orthodoxy to which Copernicus will 
also yield, afraid to publish his revolutionary book.
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The need for the “radical act of  creation” is permitted by – it originates 
in – an acute sense of  alienation and alterity: from the world, of  the world, 
with the world. This sense of  alterity enables both the scientific vision and 
the poetic act of  creation; Banville quotes Wallace Stevens again:
From this the poem springs: that we live in a place
That is not our own, and, much more, not ourselves. (Banville, A Talk 15)
For the Irish author this inevitably extends to the social, political, cul-
tural context, and cannot but recall Stephen Dedalus’ words in A Portrait 
of  the Artist as a Young Man, where Stephen, the Artist, also attributes a 
generative function to this sense of  alterity. While talking to the Dean of  
Studies, an Englishman, he thinks:
His language, so familiar and so foreign, will always be for me an acquired speech. 
I have not made or accepted its words. My voice holds them at bay. My soul frets 
in the shadow of  his language. (189)
It is precisely because of  this fretting of  his soul that Stephen will 
become an artist, but this also raises, in our context, much more specific 
and specifically historical questions of  national identity. What may be dis-
placed onto the historical position and appropriations of  Copernicus – is 
he German, Prussian, Polish, Ermlander? – is the question, particularly 
bitter in the 1970s, of  Northern Ireland and of  Irishness, of  independ-
ence, of  independent thought and its relationship with national and indi-
vidual identity; and, echoing Joyce, of  the way nationalism can become 
one of  those “nets” that the individual has to “fly by” (Joyce, Portrait 203) 
to achieve his autonomy:
Pressures from all sides were brought to bear on him. His brother-in-law 
Bartholomew Gertner, that fervent patriot, stopped speaking to him after the 
Canon one day during his stay at Torun had refused to declare himself, by in-
clination if  not strictly by birth, a true German. Suddenly he was being called 
upon to question his very nationality! and he discovered that he did not know 
what it was. Bishop Lucas, however, resolved that difficulty straightaway. “You 
are not German, nephew, no, nor are you a Pole, nor even a Prussian. You are an 
Ermlander, simple. Remember it.”
     And so, meekly, he became what he was told to be. But it was only one 
more mask. Behind it he was that which no name nor nation could claim. He was 
Doctor Copernicus. (94)
Just like his individual identity as a scientist displaces his social one, sci-
ence becomes a way out of  the “nightmare of  history” (Joyce, Ulysses 34). 
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But history and science cannot be unhinged: for the Nazis Copernicus 
could not be a Pole because he was a genius, for the Poles he is a national 
hero. History re-appropriates the scientist, turns him again into a battle-
field of  nationalities and racial, national and cultural superiority.
Thus, to sum up, Dr Copernicus draws from and unsettles a wide 
range of  genres. It reconstructs clearly identified historical events (wars 
in Central Europe in the late fifteenth-early sixteenth centuries, intrigue 
in Renaissance Italy, changes from a feudal to an early modern world, 
Columbus’ travels, the discoveries of  the era), and it can therefore be 
called a historical novel (given its mixing of  accurate historical references 
and allegorical passages we may ask, of  the romance or the realist type?). 
Or would be more appropriate to call it a biographical fiction? In fact, 
the genres of  biographical writing also multiply, and, as we have seen, we 
have autobiographical parts, epistolary sections, “factual” biography, and 
parts that belong to the tradition of  the Bildungsroman (which, we could 
say, is to biography as the historical novel is to history). Of  course, it is 
also a book about the scientific discovery of  an almost literally earth-mov-
ing theory, which describes its early reception and, through anachronistic 
references to and quotations from later physicists and philosophers (from 
Kierkegaard to Einstein), suggests its later effects on the development of  
science up to our time. It is thus a book about an individual, a scientific 
problem, and an epoch; about the beginning of  modernity, and about late 
modernity – perhaps the end of  modernity – therefore also about us, and 
our own contemporary historical and cultural crisis.
With its challenging of  the boundaries between historical fact and poetic 
creation, its mixing of  past and present, its anachronistic presentation of  
Copernicus, Doctor Copernicus is a postmodern book, what Linda Hutcheon 
would define as “historiographic metafiction”; with its nostalgic desire for 
order and allusions to the Joycean Bildungsroman it also gestures towards 
modernism; the nineteenth century principle that history is the biography 
of  great men also applies. The origins of  the historical novel are in the 
Romantic period, when the link between “historical consciousness and cul-
tural-political concepts of  the emancipation of  nations” gave rise to “a new 
conception of  art as a means of  aesthetic experience”:4 Doctor Copernicus 
also bears the hallmark of  such romantic origins of  the genre, representing 
as it does the link between nationhood, history and mythology, including, 
we have seen, the construction of  (but also the intolerance towards) a na-
tional mythology of  identity around the figure of  Copernicus.
Postmodern, modernist, nineteenth-century, romantic, early modern; 
Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, Kierkegaard, Einstein: within the bookends 
of  Copernicus at one end and the latter part of  the twentieth century at the 
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other, the novel alludes to and establishes a relationship between the his-
tory of  science, of  historical writing, of  biographical writing, of  the form 
of  the novel – all ways in which we have historically attempted to find 
ever better (and, as we realise, ever inadequate) ways to represent reality 
to ourselves. I have suggested above that the variety of  genres explored in 
Doctor Copernicus can also be seen as a way of  trying out the various forms 
through which the modern novel has attempted to represent character, 
subjectivity and the sense of  our relationship with the world: Copernicus 
appears as a centre around which different generic forms rotate, encircling 
but not enclosing him, attracted by but unable to ever quite get to the es-
sence or centre of  the character. (The heliocentric model places the centre 
of  the solar system in a mathematical point that is near to but does not co-
incide with the sun: we rotate around a void, as does Copernicus, as do our 
various attempts to represent identity or reality, whether scientifically or 
artistically.) There may thus be another reason why the novel references so 
many different generic models of  writing: because they are all used up and 
need to be rethought, just like our conception of  the world, the universe, 
and our place in it must be rethought. The old forms of  expressing truths 
no longer serve us; but we can’t discard them until we have new ones 
– in any case, because this is literature, we would not be able to discard them 
altogether and they remain part of  our construction and understanding 
of  reality. As Kuhn suggests, unlike science, which replaces old models 
with new ones, erasing previous explanations from the scientific field and 
relegating them to history or the museum, literature does not discard old 
models but includes them in its evolution, constantly returning to them, 
revising, rewriting and re-elaborating them: “Unlike art, science destroys 
its past”; “art can support, far more readily than science, a number of  si-
multaneous incompatible traditions or schools” (Kuhn, “Comment” 345, 
348). As John Barth proposed in 1967, the exhaustion of  old forms re-
quires not their erasure, but their re-signification.
 It is in this context that two points of  analogy between Collingwood’s 
idea of  history and Kuhn’s history of  science become especially relevant: 
while neither rejects the truth of  facts and events, both unhinge them 
from a historical or scientific discourse that stakes its truth and author-
ity on its adherence to such facts – for Collingwood, authority resides in 
the historian, for Kuhn in the community of  scientists, and both accept 
the necessity of  narrative structures that are in turn analogous, in various 
ways, to those of  literature. The novelist Banville goes further in pursuing 
the analogy than either Collingwood or Kuhn, and his work posits that all 
of  them are supreme and necessary fictions produced by our capacity to 
imagine, rationalise, and express.
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As we have seen, while still a university student in Krakow, young 
Copernicus argues with one of  his teachers, identifying in the old profes-
sor’s defence of  Ptolemy “a failure of  nerve” (the phrase comes from 
Koestler 53-65) that stubbornly continues to sustain “the old reaction-
ary dogmas” (29) despite the awareness that they no longer function ad-
equately. In the metaphor of  the pearl (“Out of  all those weary hours of  
wading through the dry sands of  a sealed mind there had been distilled 
one tiny precious drop of  a pearly doubt,” 29), the speck of  grit that be-
comes jewel (“He turned the solution this way and that, admiring it, as it 
were turning in his fingers a flawless ravishing jewel,” 85) references the 
way in which marginal data that the paradigm of  normal science cannot 
sift accrete questions, until they lead to what Kuhn would call a scientific 
revolution or paradigm shift, and what Doctor Copernicus more poetically 
calls “a new and radical instauration” (83) after the slow inevitable “crash-
ing down” of  the old establishment (29).
 The need to “keep our nerve” is taken up again by Banville in his 1981 
talk, when he suggested that we are “on the threshold of  a new ism”:
We are continually being told that the novel is moribund, but the fact is, if  we can 
keep our nerve, the novel is only beginning to explore its own possibilities. It can 
become the Supreme Fiction that Stevens dreamed poetry might be. If  we keep 
our nerve.
Modernism has run its course. So also, for that matter, has post-modernism. I 
believe, at least I hope, that we are on the threshold of  a new ism, a new synthesis. 
What will it be? I do not know. But I hope it will be an art which is honest enough 
to despair and yet go on; rigorous and controlled, cool and yet passionate, without 
delusions, aware of  its own possibilities and its own limits; an art which knows 
that truth is arbitrary, that reality is multifarious, that language is not a clear lens.
  Did I say new? What I have defined is as old as Homer. (16-17)
Out of  the death of  the medieval, pre-Copernican world came what 
we know as the Renaissance, the “re-birth,” anticipating the “birth of  
man” of  modernity that Michel Foucault describes in The Order of  Things. 
Man was de-centred from the universe but found in himself  a new centre 
on which to rebuild all knowledge and all faith: Cogito, ergo sum. If  in the 
postmodern, post-humanist context this modern subject faces a “death” 
through the dissolving of  its transcendence, reinterpreted as an effect of  
language and of  desire, and the objectivity of  external reality (scientific, 
historical), is recast, at least partly, as an effect of  narrative, once again 
we must “keep our nerve” as these deaths will lead to new births, though 
we may not yet know what they are. Banville is specifically talking about 
artistic forms, but his “hope” can be thus taken to refer, more generally, to 
the intellectual and cultural (as well as political and economic) structures 
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of  our society. Seeing the magnitude of  the historical, political, cultural, 
religious upheavals that our world is experiencing today, over three deca-
des after Banville’s novel, we must certainly agree that we need to “keep 
our nerve” through this latest “Copernican revolution,” and that explo-
ring the forms that these revolutions take, their roots, and their possible 
consequences, is more than a literary game, much more than the amusing 
but shallow playfulness with forms that postmodernism has so often been 
accused of  staging: it is, on the contrary, essential to our historical con-
sciousness – a consciousness turned as much to the past as to the future; 
aware of  the cyclical recurrence of  crises; that we do not have the truth; 
and that we shall continue to endeavour to find new ways of  describing 
reality and our place in the world, negotiating between alternative expla-
nations; because it is only by accepting the provisional and contingent 
nature of  our truths that we can recognise our individual and collective 
responsibility to history.
NOTES
1 The book was first published posthumously in 1946, but this chapter dates to 1935.
2 On the misuse of  Kuhn and the differences that he identifies between the two models 
see especially John Neubauer, “Reflections.”
3 This is the first in the “Revolutions Trilogy” that also includes Kepler (1981) and The 
Newton Letter (1982).
4 From the programme of  “History and Its Literary Genres” (Lipica, 7-8 September 
2006), at which this paper was presented.
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